A decision on the dismissal of officials of state institutions on grounds of no confidence is adopted by secret ballot by a majority of more than half of all Members of the Seimas, in practical terms at least 71 votes (Article 218(4) of the Statute of the Seimas).
For L. Matjošaitytė, the essential issue this week is whether the Seimas, by secret ballot, will adopt a resolution terminating her mandate as a member of the Central Electoral Commission, and her request that the matter be considered in her absence does not preclude that possibility. Article 218(4) of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania provides that a decision on the dismissal of officials of state institutions on grounds of no confidence is adopted by secret ballot by a majority of more than half of all Members of the Seimas, in practical terms at least 71 votes. The precise procedural issue to be resolved on Tuesday is whether the official’s absence provides grounds to adjourn the consideration, or whether the Statute permits the matter to be examined in her absence. The sources provided indicate that Article 218(2) of the Statute guarantees the official only the right to speak and to answer questions, but contains no provision prohibiting consideration of the matter in the official’s absence. The principal material on which the initiators of the no-confidence motion will rely is not procedural but substantive: the allegation that the CEC member advised “Nemuno aušra” and concealed that fact, which, in their view, is contrary to the principle of impartiality in Article 25 of the Electoral Code and to the requirements applicable to members of electoral commissions under Article 26.
The procedure under the Statute is as follows:
L. Matjošaitytė’s request not to participate means that she waives the opportunity to use the time provided under Article 218(2) to make a statement and answer questions. This is her procedural right, not an obligation, and the Statute does not link her absence to the impossibility of considering the matter. An important assessment factor is the renewed inclusion of the issue on the agenda: Article 217(4) prohibits Members of the Seimas from repeatedly demanding, during the same session, the dismissal of the same official, but the consideration scheduled for 24 September did not take place because the consideration itself failed to occur, not because a decision was not adopted. Accordingly, that provision does not invalidate the current initiative. On the substantive assessment, namely whether advice to a political party and concealment of that advice constitute grounds to find a loss of confidence, the Statute leaves Members of the Seimas political discretion. The legal context is shaped by parallel investigations: Article 26(3) of the Electoral Code requires members of political organisations appointed on the proposal of the Minister of Justice to suspend their membership in the political organisation before taking office. Membership itself is disputed here, but the advisory relationship is being assessed as falling close to the protected area addressed by that safeguard. Internal CEC oversight would proceed under the CEC Rules on Ethics and Anti-Corruption Conduct: upon receiving substantiated information about a possible breach, the CEC Chair must, within five working days, form a Commission of at least three persons, which has the right to obtain explanations and adopt decisions of a recommendatory nature. However, those Rules regulate the conduct of CEC employees, not members of the Commission, and therefore the limits of their application to L. Matjošaitytė are not clearly apparent from the sources provided. The sources provided contain no Seimas practice concerning comparable no-confidence proceedings against a CEC member, and therefore no specific precedent can be relied upon.
There are two main possible scenarios on Tuesday:
Non-participation is not procedurally protective: under Article 218(2) of the Statute, her speaking time simply remains unused, while the decision may still be adopted. Three independent investigations are proceeding in parallel: the CEC is examining the scope of the advice provided, the Lithuanian Bar Association is assessing whether the rules governing the activities of advocates were breached, and the Chief Official Ethics Commission is investigating a possible breach of interest-conflict declaration requirements. Their conclusions may provide material for further decisions. Monitoring point: the vote at the plenary sitting of the Seimas scheduled for Tuesday, 6 October 2026 — await the Seimas resolution on no confidence, by which the CEC member’s mandate will either be terminated or the issue will be closed for the duration of this session.
Simple evasion absent those elements constitutes only a criminal misdemeanour: a fine or arrest under Article 314(2) of the Criminal Code.
Only persons listed in Article 3(1) of the Law are exempt from conscription, and a deputy mayor is not included among them.
Kelmė Deputy Mayor Tadas Kasparas is not currently facing criminal liability; his situation remains at the stage of administrative and medical assessment. The more precise legal issue for the court is different: whether the office of deputy mayor is equivalent to those positions for which the Law on Conscription and Alternative National Defence Service grants the right to defer service, namely Members of the Seimas, mayors, and municipal council members, even though deputy mayors are not named in the new version of the law. For this reason, T. Kasparas has applied to the court seeking clarification, raising the issue of amendments to the Law on Local Self-Government and their compatibility with the Constitution.
The duties and rights in this situation are distributed as follows:
Realistic scenarios for further developments are as follows:
Under Article 50 of the Law on Public Procurement, an official declaration by the supplier is required confirming that no grounds for exclusion exist, while Article 46(1) requires the exclusion of a supplier where the relevant criminal offence is established.
Article 13(1) of the Law on the Protection of Objects of Importance to Ensuring National Security provides that essential entities must notify the Commission of transactions regardless of value if, during the tender, requirements were imposed concerning suppliers’ compliance with national security interests.
For the winners of the Vilnius passenger transport tender, UAB Vlasava and TOKS, the legal position is currently favourable: the courts of first instance and appeal dismissed the Latvian carriers’ complaints, but because the case is pending before the Supreme Court of Lithuania, the signing of the contracts is, in practice, suspended pending resolution of the dispute. The specific legal issue to be determined on cassation has two parts: whether Vlasava concealed a debt to Sodra (EUR 203) on the tender submission date and whether that constitutes grounds for its exclusion under Article 46 of the Law on Public Procurement of the Republic of Lithuania; and whether TOKS’s dealings with the Belarusian state enterprise Minsktrans are inconsistent with national security interests, assessed under Articles 11 and 13 of the Law on the Protection of Objects of Importance to Ensuring National Security of the Republic of Lithuania.
Under Article 17(1) of the Law on Public Procurement, the contracting authority must ensure the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency. It was precisely these principles that led the Court of Appeal, as early as last year, to uphold the legality of the tender conditions themselves, dismissing the complaint brought by the Polish company Mobilis. As regards Vlasava’s debt, the courts assessed the supplier’s obligation to provide accurate information: Article 50 of the Law on Public Procurement requires an official declaration by the supplier that no grounds for exclusion exist, while Article 46(1) requires the exclusion of a supplier where the relevant criminal offence is established. The courts’ position in this case is twofold:
With respect to TOKS, the courts assessed the national security argument through the criteria in Article 11(1) of the Law on the Protection of Objects of Importance to Ensuring National Security and found that a single route in Belarus does not in itself amount to “activity in that country”, and that TOKS has no branch there. Moreover, the permit for the international Vilnius-Minsk route was issued by the Lithuanian Transport Safety Administration, which weakens the claimants’ argument that the company is inconsistent with security interests. An important procedural provision is Article 13(1) of that law: essential entities under the Law on Public Procurement must notify the Commission of transactions regardless of value if, during the tender, requirements were imposed concerning suppliers’ compliance with national security interests. If no such requirements were imposed in this tender, that review mechanism is not triggered, and the security assessment remains within the competence of the courts rather than the Commission. A smaller-scale dispute is the Kautra case: on 28 August, the Court of Appeal dismissed its application to annul its exclusion from the tender, notwithstanding the assertion that its price was EUR 7.6 million lower. This shows that a price advantage does not cure errors in the assessment of qualification or exclusion grounds if the contracting authority did not establish them. For procurements by contracting entities in the transport sector, Article 59 of the Law on Procurement by Contracting Entities Operating in the Water Management, Energy, Transport or Postal Services Sectors is additionally applicable; it refers the application of exclusion grounds and qualification requirements to Articles 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the Law on Public Procurement. This confirms that both the assessment of Vlasava’s debt and the national security assessment concerning TOKS are to be resolved precisely under those provisions.
The cassation appeal before the Supreme Court of Lithuania is the claimants’ final procedural instrument:
For the municipality, the risk is not limited to the loss of time: if the cassation court were to find that the assessment of exclusion grounds was unlawful, the court could order a review of the tender results, which would also affect the TOKS portion, the price of which was EUR 3.4 million higher than Kautra’s bid.
Under Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code, concerning public ridicule or contempt on grounds of religion, the potential penalty is imprisonment for up to two years, while under Article 284 of the Criminal Code the range of penalties extends from community service to imprisonment for up to two years.
Under Article 178(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, victims have the right to submit written requests to the prosecutor for procedural actions to be carried out; the prosecutor must examine such a request no later than within ten days.
This matter involves the intersection of two separate criminal cases: a pre-trial investigation into possible human trafficking and document forgery, in which suspicions have been brought against seven natural persons and two legal entities, including Mufti R. Jakubauskas, and an investigation into the public burning of the Qur’an in Vilnius, in which four persons have been notified of suspicion under Article 170 of the Criminal Code and for disturbance of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code. The legal position of all suspects remains, for now, at the pre-trial investigation stage: charges have not yet been brought before a court, but 64 persons have already been recognized as victims, which gives rise to their procedural rights. The precise legal issue is whether the circumstances of the employment of Philippine nationals meet the elements of human trafficking, and whether the burning of the Qur’an on Etmonų Street had an incitement purpose and displayed the elements of disturbance of public order. This will be assessed under Articles 170 and 284 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, applying the rules on accomplice liability under Article 26 of the Criminal Code. At the same time, the issue of the internal governance of religious communities is governed by Article 7 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations: the association has the right to regulate its internal affairs independently.
In the human trafficking case, Article 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the rights of a suspect: to know what they are suspected of, to have defence counsel from the first questioning, to remain silent, to access the investigation materials, and to appeal the prosecutor’s actions. These rights apply to the Mufti, to the other six natural persons, and to the persons representing the legal entities. The emphasis on the presumption of innocence in the association’s resolution is consistent with the fact that a suspicion is not yet proof of guilt. For the 64 persons recognized as victims, including Philippine nationals who worked under contracts with “FA Solutions” at the Vilnius poultry farm owned by “Akola Group,” Article 178(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants the right to submit written requests to the prosecutor for specific procedural actions to be carried out. In the Qur’an-burning case, the elements to be assessed differ depending on the legal classification:
Against the position of “FA Solutions” and “World Halal Trust” that the working conditions were appropriate, and the poultry farm’s statement that the Philippine nationals were not its employees, law enforcement authorities must prove the circumstances of exploitation, including the seizure of documents, excessive working hours, and improper conditions. The assessment of those facts will depend on the evidentiary outcome.
The most realistic scenarios for the further course of the proceedings are as follows: once the pre-trial investigation is completed, the prosecutor will adopt a procedural decision, either bringing charges and referring the case to court or terminating the investigation. Until then, coercive measures may be applied to the suspects under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if there are grounds to believe that they may abscond, obstruct the proceedings, or commit further offences. If the court finds the four persons guilty in relation to the burning of the Qur’an, they face penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment under Article 170 of the Criminal Code or alternative penalties under Article 284 of the Criminal Code. In the human trafficking case, the practical significance is greatest for the two legal entities, “FA Solutions” and “World Halal Trust,” because a conviction, or even the investigation itself, may affect their operational reputation and contractual relations with contractors. “Akola Group” distances itself on the basis that the Philippine nationals were not its employees. The resolution by which the Union of Lithuanian Tatar Communities distances itself has no legal consequences for the Mufti’s case, but, in the context of Article 7 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations, it demonstrates that the internal structures and public positions of religious communities fall within their autonomous competence.
If a new construction permitting document is not obtained within the agreed time limit, Kaunas City Municipality undertakes, at its own expense, to demolish or dismantle the new structures built under the previous construction permitting documents and to restore the construction site.
Under Article 33(1)(1) of the Law on Construction, where construction has commenced, an application for annulment of a construction permitting document and elimination of the consequences of construction is brought before a court of general jurisdiction.
The legal fate of the sections of the Kaunas southeastern bypass constructed under construction permitting documents issued by the Kaunas City Municipality Administration in 2021 and 2022 now depends on the performance of the settlement agreement, rather than on a court judgment ordering demolition. In 2023, the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate found that both documents had been issued unlawfully, as they “substantively and in their content contravene legal acts of higher legal force”, and, pursuant to Article 33(1)(1) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania, applied to a court of general jurisdiction for annulment of the documents and elimination of the consequences of construction, since construction had already commenced. The precise issue is whether the construction will be legalized through new design documentation and a new construction permitting document, or whether Article 33(2) of the Law on Construction will apply: a court order requiring the developer, within a time limit set by the court and at the expense of the persons found at fault by the court, to demolish the structure and restore the construction site.
The settlement agreement places the risk squarely on the municipality through the structure of contractual obligations:
For project implementers and sponsors, the real risk is concentrated in the agreed deadline: a new construction permitting document must be obtained before it expires, otherwise the obligation to demolish or dismantle falls on the municipal budget. Through the settlement agreement, the Inspectorate preserved its supervisory position: the agreement provides for “clear guarantees ensuring the performance of the obligations assumed”, while, for the time being, by not invoking the demolition sanction under Article 33(2) of the Law on Construction, it has chosen a path of dialogue. For users of the road infrastructure, there are practically no consequences while legalization is under way. The point to monitor is the final court decision terminating the proceedings in which the settlement agreement was concluded, and the subsequent progress, within the agreed time limit, of the issuance of the new construction permitting document.