Under Article 6.242(1) of the Civil Code, a person who has dishonestly enriched himself without legal basis must compensate another person for losses in the amount of the unjust enrichment.
Under Article 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the case is heard at first instance by a district court, because the amount of the claim (EUR 15,400) does not exceed the EUR 100,000 threshold established in Article 27(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Deputy Minister K. Spūdys’s Unjust Enrichment: Civil Claim and Pre-Trial Investigation K. Spūdys’s legal position is determined by two parallel proceedings: a civil claim for unjust enrichment, by which the prosecutor’s office seeks the return of more than EUR 15,400 to Marijampolė Municipality, and an STT pre-trial investigation supervised by the prosecutor’s office concerning possible abuse of office for material gain. Until the pre-trial investigation is severed and a notice of suspicion is served, the issue of criminal liability has not yet been determined; at present, only the proprietary claim is in dispute. The precise legal issue is whether the reimbursements received from the municipal budget (EUR 16,000 during the term of office, including EUR 11,200 for fuel, almost EUR 3,400 for vehicle repairs and maintenance, and EUR 585 for mobile communications) were paid without legal basis, i.e. whether they constitute unjust enrichment under Article 6.242(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, pursuant to which a person who has dishonestly enriched himself without legal basis must compensate another person for losses in the amount of the unjust enrichment. Article 6.237 of the Civil Code, which establishes the obligation to return property acquired without basis, and Article 6.241 of the Civil Code, whose exceptions (for example, amounts of wages and equivalent payments received in good faith) may form a line of defence, are also relevant.
In this case, the prosecutor acts on the basis of Article 49(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which grants the right to bring an action in defence of the public interest. This explains why the claimant is not the municipality, but the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor’s Office, although the funds are to be awarded for the benefit of the municipality. The procedural framework is as follows:
The most realistic scenarios are:
Under Article 139(1) of the Criminal Code, negligent injury may be punishable by community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year; all penalties are alternative, and none is mandatory.
Under Article 139(3) of the Criminal Code and Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a pre-trial investigation into this act may be commenced only upon the victim’s complaint or a statement by her legal representative, and, under Article 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, upon a prosecutor’s request where the act is of public significance.
In the case of the accidental discharge of a lawfully held Nagant revolver in a Kaišiadorys store, the pre-trial investigation has been reclassified under a less frequently applied offence: negligent minor impairment of health. On that basis, the firearm owner faces only alternative penalties, rather than mandatory imprisonment. This turns on the assessment of the form of guilt: the prosecution considers that the injury was caused negligently, not intentionally. The court deciding the specific issues will have to determine whether the elements of the offence under Article 139(1) of the Criminal Code are made out, whether negligence is established at all, and whether liability may proceed, since this offence is exclusively within the “private prosecution” framework; see Article 139(3) of the Criminal Code and Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This offence is a negligent crime within the meaning of Article 16 of the Criminal Code: guilt may take the form of criminal recklessness or criminal negligence. On the facts presented, a man born in 1961, while standing at the checkout, dropped from his hands a handbag containing a loaded, lawfully held revolver. The essence of the classification will lie in the contested issue of whether such conduct amounts to criminal negligence or was an accident. In this case, the prosecutor’s request justifies the continuation of the investigation; this is why the Prosecutor General’s Office stated that the investigation is continuing on the basis of a prosecutor’s request. Without a complaint or a prosecutor’s request, the proceedings cannot proceed. The previous classification, most likely under Article 138(2)(3) of the Criminal Code, carries imprisonment for up to five years, whereas the current classification under Article 139(1) limits the maximum term of imprisonment to one year. If the medical assessment under the Government-approved rules for determining the extent of health impairment (Article 141(1) of the Criminal Code) were to find that the woman suffered the consequences listed in Article 135(1) of the Criminal Code, the classification would revert to Article 137(1): negligent serious impairment of health, punishable by imprisonment for up to three years. If special statutory safety rules for conduct involving a firearm were breached, Article 137(3) would apply, carrying up to five years’ imprisonment, and under Article 137(4) a legal person would also be liable where it is a participant. In such a case, the aggravating circumstance under Article 60(1)(10) of the Criminal Code would also have to be assessed: the act was committed using a firearm. The sources provided do not contain specific case law concerning similar situations, so reliance on precedent is not possible.
In practical terms, several scenarios are possible:
Article 3 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection assigns to the system the duty to monitor, assess and reduce the risk factors established in the National Security Strategy. This constitutes the legal basis for managing a “permanent crisis” without resorting to a state-of-emergency regime.
Article 6 of the Law on the Basics of National Security provides that Lithuania shall immediately request NATO consultations when it perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity or security. This is a legal mechanism for responding to provocations that do not reach the threshold of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Atlantic Council study’s thesis concerning a “deterrence gap” is reflected in Lithuania’s legal system as a structural choice: routine hybrid provocations, such as drone incursions, sabotage, and cyberattacks, generally do not meet the threshold for declaring a state of emergency under Article 144 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the State must act under the ordinary legal regime for security. This gives rise to a precise legal question: whether Lithuania’s crisis management and cybersecurity systems have standing, non-ad hoc powers to manage “grey zone” threats that are legally classified neither as armed attack nor as a state of emergency. The issue is assessed under Article 3 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, Articles 5 and 19 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Cybersecurity, and Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Basics of National Security.
Article 3 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection assigns to the system not only the elimination of emergencies, but also the duty to monitor, assess and reduce the risk factors established in the National Security Strategy and to issue warnings about them. Article 3 of the Law on the Basics of National Security provides that the Government, with the approval of the State Defence Council, submits the National Security Strategy to the Seimas for approval, setting out threats and priorities. The study’s call to establish deterrence of hybrid threats as a priority therefore, in practical terms, means updating that Strategy. Article 6 of the Law on the Basics of National Security enshrines the principle of universal and unconditional defence, aligned with NATO’s collective defence principle, and provides that Lithuania shall immediately request NATO consultations when it perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity or security. This is a direct legal mechanism for responding to provocations that do not reach the threshold of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 of the Law on International Operations, Military Exercises and Other Military Cooperation Events permits allied military units to enter Lithuania and be used on its territory for the purposes of collective defence operations; however, the decision is taken by the Seimas on the proposal of the President of the Republic. Scenarios involving rapid force deployment therefore require a pre-prepared procedural chain. In the cyber domain, Article 19 of the Law on Cybersecurity requires the processing of data on cyber incidents and near-miss incidents; the Ministry of National Defence is the system controller, and the National Cyber Security Centre is the processor. Article 5 assigns that Ministry responsibility for cooperation with NATO and EU institutions on cybersecurity matters. Article 1(1) of the Law on the Protection of Objects of Importance to Ensuring National Security, in the version of 11 July 2024, requires the protection of important objects and transactions of essential cybersecurity entities against all risk factors threatening national security interests. This is a legal measure against sabotage and influence-network threats to critical infrastructure. Article 4(1)(16) of the Law on the State Defence Council, which entered into force on 1 February 2026, empowers the State Defence Council to approve measures for eliminating external risk factors in the conduct of intelligence activities. This is an institutional response to the problem, identified in the study, of fragmentation in intelligence-related threat assessment.
In practical terms, this means that Lithuania’s response to hybrid provocations will proceed not through the declaration of a state of emergency, but through the exercise of the prevention, warning and threat-reduction functions provided for in Article 3 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, and through the incident-management system established by Article 19 of the Law on Cybersecurity. If the provocations intensify, the mechanism under Article 144 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Law on the State of Emergency remains available as a reserve mechanism: the decision is taken by the Seimas, and between sessions by the President of the Republic, whose decision the Seimas either approves or revokes. In the event of a crisis requiring the deployment of allied forces, the Seimas, on the proposal of the President of the Republic, will adopt a resolution under Article 5(2) of the Law on International Operations, Military Exercises and Other Military Cooperation Events; the speed of the procedure will depend on pre-prepared plans. Paragraph 21 of the Agreement between Lithuania and Ukraine on Cooperation in the Field of Security obliges the parties to cooperate in strengthening cyber resilience and protecting critical infrastructure. Accordingly, the incorporation of lessons from Ukraine’s war has a legal basis in bilateral commitments. Monitoring point: the updating of the National Security Strategy under Article 3 of the Law on the Basics of National Security, specifically whether deterrence of hybrid threats will be established in it as a permanent State security function with a separate budget and designated responsible institutions.
The regulation was initiated by the Government (with draft legislation prepared by the responsible ministries) in response to the decision adopted at the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit concerning the permanent deployment of forward NATO forces (battalion-sized) in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland. The objective was to ensure proper support for those military units and the provision of host-nation support, as well as to give legal effect to the long-term presence of NATO forces as a national security priority, reflected in the National Security Strategy updated in 2017. The principal argument was the provision in the Warsaw Communiqué that NATO forces would be deployed “for as long as necessary”, making it necessary to amend the provisions of the laws governing the organisation of the national defence system, the fundamentals of national security and the civil service, in order to ensure a coherent and sustainable regulatory framework for supporting those forces.
Article 8(1)(3) of the Statute of the Seimas establishes that resignation by written statement is an independent ground for termination of powers, requiring neither approval by the Seimas nor impeachment proceedings.
In this matter, the legal assessment is determined primarily by the institution of parliamentary responsibility: the resignation of a Member of the Seimas terminates her mandate not by the will of the Seimas, but pursuant to the closed list of grounds established by law. The more precise question, namely the procedure by which a Member relinquishes a Seimas mandate and when that termination is formalised, is governed by Article 8(1) of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that a Member’s powers terminate when the Member “resigns by written statement” (point 3). The component concerning the Index of Economic Freedom is not a legal development, but an indicator of the market environment, the constitutional basis of which is Article 46 of the Constitution: the national economy is based on private ownership, freedom of individual economic activity and initiative, while the law prohibits monopolisation of production and the market and protects freedom of fair competition.
From a procedural perspective, two provisions are relevant:
The practical consequences follow from the mechanics of the Statute:
Correction. No text provided.
Compensation paid in accordance with the procedure established by legal acts is not taxable for the resident; this follows directly from Article 17(1)(5) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Personal Income Tax.
Applications may be submitted from 2:00 p.m. on 1 October 2026 until 4:00 p.m. on 31 December 2026, or until the funds allocated to the call are exhausted, and an application may be submitted only once the new heat production installation has already been installed.
For residents who have replaced old heating installations using biomass or fossil fuels, the situation gives rise not to an obligation but to a right to compensation from EUR 10 million in grants administered by the Lithuanian Energy Agency. The key legal qualification is that compensation paid in accordance with the procedure established by legal acts is not taxable for the resident. This follows directly from Article 17(1)(5) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Personal Income Tax, which includes in the list of non-taxable income “compensations in the amounts established in laws or other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania”, as well as compensations whose amounts are not fixed but whose payment is regulated by laws and Government resolutions. The precise legal issue to be determined by LEA when deciding on applications is whether the applicant is entitled to receive support: whether the applicant is a natural person who owns the immovable property in which an inefficient biofuel or fossil-fuel boiler, or an air-based heating installation, has been replaced, and whether the installation meets the technical requirements under Article 46 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Energy from Renewable Sources. The procedural issue is the procedure under which an LEA decision may be appealed; this is governed by the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Administrative Proceedings.
LEA is a public institution whose sole owner is the State, and its functions, including the administration of support in accordance with the procedure established by the Government or an institution authorised by it, are set out in Article 13-1(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Energy. An application may be submitted only once the new heat production installation has already been installed, together with a payment request and all required documents. For installations covered by the support scheme, Article 46(1)-(3) of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources provides that they must comply with technical requirements approved by the Minister of Energy or an institution authorised by the Government, and that technical specifications are to be prepared in accordance with harmonised or European Union standards, with priority given to harmonised standards whose references have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. In practical terms, this means that application assessment proceeds along two lines: subjective entitlement (ownership of immovable property, type of replaced installation) and objective compliance with technical specifications. The class 5 biofuel boilers and heat pumps referred to in the notice are precisely an expression of such specifications. If LEA rejects an application or does not award compensation, that decision may be appealed to an administrative court under the Law on Administrative Proceedings; Article 30(1) of that Law allows a missed time limit to be restored where it was missed for an important reason, subject to the limitation that the time limit may not be restored if more than ten years have elapsed since the adoption of the contested legal act. The sources provided contain no case law applicable specifically to these compensations, and therefore no assessment can be made on the basis of precedent.
For a resident who manages to submit an application with a payment request and documents before the end of the call, the compensation, if granted, will fall within the category of non-taxable income under Article 17(1)(5) of the Law on Personal Income Tax, and it will not need to be declared as taxable income. The risk scenario for the resident is rejection of the application due to failure to meet the subjective conditions or technical specifications under Article 46 of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources; in that case, the administrative appeal procedure under the Law on Administrative Proceedings remains available, and if the time limit has been missed, an application may be made to restore it for an important reason. The second practical risk is exhaustion of funds: the call is valid “or until the funds allocated to the calls are exhausted”, meaning that applications submitted later may remain unfunded even though the formal deadline has not yet expired. This is particularly relevant because, under previous calls, more than EUR 71 million has already been paid to 21,700 residents. Municipalities perform an information function within this structure, but decisions on support are made by LEA as the competent administrative authority.
Precision supplement: it should be noted that the text of Article 124 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings provided regulates the filing of complaints with the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania against decisions of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, not complaints against LEA decisions. Accordingly, the visible part of that article is not directly applicable as a basis for appealing LEA decisions; appealability is based on the general provisions of the Law on Administrative Proceedings.